S10508
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
September 12, 1969

anti-Fasclst. But as Prof. Gabriel Kolko has 
demonstrated, twenty-six of the top 100 
American corporations of 1937 were Involved 
in significant cartel and contractual agree­ments 
with Nazi Germany. And fifty-six 
American companies were connected with the 
backbone of Hitler's war machine, the I. G. 
Farben Company. Standard Oil helped 
Ger­many develop both synthetic rubber and 100- 
octane aviation fuel. Bendix Aviation, 
con­trolled by General Motors, as late as 1940 
pro­vided a German company (Robert Bosch) 
with complete data on aircraft and diesel 
engine starters in return for royalties. As an 
official of the Dow Chemical Company boldly 
remarked In the 1930s: "We do not Inquire 
into the uses of the products. We are 
inter­ested in selling them." This attitude was 
made clear too by the businessmen who 
con­tinued to ship scrap metal and oil to Italy, 
even though the President asked for a 
volun­tary embargo in 1935. In fact, in the last 
three months of 1935, American oil shipments 
to Mussolini's Italy tripled. The' isolationists 
were important watchdogs over American 
business. We have few watchdogs today, and 
have moved into the era of conglomerates, 
with some companies dependent upon 
mili­tary orders and contributing through lobbies 
to the world's arms race.
Some critics of the isolationists have 
in­correctly interpreted isolationism to mean 
friendliness toward fascism, or at least a 
condoning of fascism. The isolationist camp 
did attract Fascists, but they did not 
con­stitute the movement. Indeed, numerous 
liberal isolationists were early and vociferous 
in their denunciation of Hitlerism and the 
persecution of the Jews. Oswald Garrison 
Villard, for example, in 1933 and 1935 urged 
Western Europe to boycott Hitler's Germany 
and Mussolini's Italy, and in 1936 appealed 
to the League of Nations to act against 
Hit­ler. Villard became despondent, as did many 
isolationists, when the other European 
na­tions themselves would do nothing to 
con­tain the dictators. "The overwhelming 
ma­jority of all isolationists," Jonas has written, 
"had no desire to see the Axis Powers gain 
their ends."
The Spanish Civil War was particularly 
agonizing for liberal Isolationists, and the 
response of many of them suggests their 
flexibility and their opposition to fascism. 
How can one be committed to both peace and 
liberty? Many isolationists chose liberty, and 
encouraged the Roosevelt administration to 
aid the anti-Franco Loyalists. But to their 
dismay and surprise, the President and 
Sec­retary of State Cordell Hull performed like 
strict isolationists by imposing an arms 
em­bargo on Spain. Furthermore, Roosevelt 
fol­lowed the lead of the European noninterven­tion 
committee, which proved unworkable in 
the face of German, Italian and Russian 
intervention.
If some Isolationists demonstrated that 
they would accept selective intervention, as 
in the Spanish Civil War, others later showed 
themselves capable of changing their minds 
over the question of aiding Britain against 
the rising Germany. Many liberals quit the 
isolationist ranks in 1939-41, leaving 
con­servatives there, and thus contributing tot
the notion that conservatism and isolation­ism 
were linked. It should be stated, too, 
that the isolationists cannot be blamed for 
the coming of World War II. Germany did 
not depend upon American isolationism in 
making its plans. Britain and France let Ger­many 
nibble for a number of years, conced­ing 
to Fascist demands. Not until April of 
1939 did France and Britain guarantee the 
independence of Poland. The League of 
Na­tion was moribund in the 1930s, its members 
unwilling to take decisive action. The Soviet 
Union was excluded from membership until 
1934 and then ousted In 1939. Germany was 
admitted to the League in 1926 and departed 
in 1934. Both Japan and Italy withdrew in 
the mid-thirties. Britain was more interested
in balance of power than collective security. 
As Robert A. Divine has suggested, European 
appeasers co-authored the American 
Neu­trality Acts, because some Americans 
con­cluded that we had better steer clear of the 
chaos In Europe.
Scholars and politicians have distorted 
iso­lationism and confused a useful heritage. We 
cannot accept the notion of Fortress 
Amer­ica; we reject strict unilateralism and the 
idea of a foreign policy conspiracy. But there 
is much value in the isolationist argument 
for freedom of action and limited commit­ments 
in foreign relations. This does not 
mean a rejection of international coopera­tion 
and the United Nations. It means 
sim­ply Independence and freedom of choice. Our 
alliance arrangements may drag us clumsily 
into wars. As someone has put It, we have 
constructed Pearl Harbors throughout the 
world. We cling to obsolete agreements like 
NATO which tie us to collapsing military 
al­liances and impede East-West relations. We 
should give more attention, too, to the 
iso­lationist call for nonintervention and 
self- determination.
The isolationist critique is relevant to the 
senseless war in Vietnam which, among other 
detriments, has crippled a domestic reform 
movement. As America moves to the 
politi­cal fight, the isolationist warning of war's 
effect on civil liberties is Imposing. We might 
recall, too, that the isolationists worried 
about the growing and somewhat 
independ­ent role of the President in foreign affairs. 
Today Congressmen are questioning the 
evo­lution of Presidential commitments in 
Viet­nam without a declaration of war. The 
"Na­tional Commitments Resolution," 
intro­duced by Senators Fulbright and Gore, and 
recently passed by a 70-to-16 vote, expressed
the Senate's desire for participation in 
na­tional security questions.
In this day of global diplomacy and 
world­wide military skirmishes, we might reflect 
upon the Isolationist critique of the 1930s 
and its significance to our problems. Surely 
many Americans share with the isolationists 
the fear (in the words of Prof. Warren 
Cohen) "that social democracy may die in 
the United States if It has to be fostered 
abroad by force rather than by precept."



BACKGROUND OF U.S. 
INTER­VENTION IN VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in 
terms of flaunting by Government 
offi­cials of the people's right to know the 
facts, there has been no period in 
Amer­ican history comparable to that of our 
involvement in Vietnam. From the 
shoddy disregard of the Geneva accords, 
through the misrepresentation 
sur­rounding passage of the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution, down to the present-day 
at­tempt to pass off the dictatorial 
Thieu regime as a government which shares 
our values, the executive branch of the 
Government has failed-and continues 
to fail-to come clean with the American 
public.
Throughout this tragic period the 
Committee on Foreign Relations has 
at­tempted to give the public the facts 
necessary to make informed decisions on 
the wisdom of Vietnam policy. The 
lat­est effort was prompted by a comment 
by General Westmoreland in a 
publi­cation issued by the Department of 
De­fense earlier this year, entitled "Report 
on the War in Vietnam." General 
West­moreland, in discussing the 
circum­stances surrounding the sending of the 
first U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 
1965, wrote:
It was my estimate that the government 
of Vietnam could not survive this mounting 
enemy military and political offensive for 
more than six months unless the United 
States chose to increase its military 
commit­ment. Substantial numbers of U.S. ground 
combat forces were required.
I realized, as did Ambassadors Taylor and 
Johnson, that the U.S. was faced with a 
mo­mentous and far-reaching decision. In 
mak­ing my recommendations in the spring and 
early summer of 1965, as indeed in the case of 
later recommendations, I was mindful of the 
stated U.S. objective with respect to Vietnam: 
"To defeat aggression so that the people of 
South Vietnam will be free to shape their own 
destiny." It was my judgment that this end 
could not be achieved without the deploy­ment 
of U.S. forces. With the concurrence 
of Ambassador Taylor, I so recommended.
I was struck by the fact that there was 
no mention by General Westmoreland of 
a request for U.S. troops from the South 
Vietnamese Government. General 
West­moreland wrote:
It was my estimate that the government 
of Vietnam could not survive ... It was my 
judgment that [the U.S. objectives] could 
not be achieved without the deployment of 
U.S. forces.
In an effort to shed light on the point. 
I wrote to Secretary of State Rogers on 
May 12 to ask for copies of any request 
from South Vietnam for U.S. interven­tion 
with combat troops. After nearly 
4 months deliberation, the 
Depart­ment wrote that there was no request but 
that-
The process of analyzing the situation by 
the two governments, and the consultation 
and agreement thereon, were such as to be 
regarded by our Government as constituting
a request from the Government of Vietnam.
I suppose I should not be surprised 
that the Government which viewed the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution as the 
"func­tional equivalent" of a declaration of war 
would send American troops off to fight a 
land war in Asia without a formal 
re­quest, for the record, from the 
govern­ment they were being sent to save. Many 
diplomatic and legal niceties, along with 
the truth, were early victims of the war.
It is shocking to realize that Congress 
was not asked for specific authority for 
the sending of American soldiers to 
South Vietnam and, indeed, that the 
gov­ernment of South Vietnam itself did not 
make a written, formal request for these 
troops.
I ask unanimous consent to have the 
exchange of correspondence with the 
Department of State printed in the 
Record at the end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, after 
reviewing the record of official conduct 
concerning this tragic war, one need not 
look further to understand the despair 
and disillusionment over governmental 
processes that afflict our young people 
today. Having been indoctrinated 
throughout their lives that Government 
decisions are a matter of open covenants, 
openly arrived at, they have found that, 
on the contrary, their Government 
nei­ther gives them the full facts about great 
public issues nor believes that the public 
should expect their officials to be 
can­did and honest.