Background of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam |
Previous | 1 of 2 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
S10508 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12, 1969 anti-Fasclst. But as Prof. Gabriel Kolko has demonstrated, twenty-six of the top 100 American corporations of 1937 were Involved in significant cartel and contractual agreements with Nazi Germany. And fifty-six American companies were connected with the backbone of Hitler's war machine, the I. G. Farben Company. Standard Oil helped Germany develop both synthetic rubber and 100- octane aviation fuel. Bendix Aviation, controlled by General Motors, as late as 1940 provided a German company (Robert Bosch) with complete data on aircraft and diesel engine starters in return for royalties. As an official of the Dow Chemical Company boldly remarked In the 1930s: "We do not Inquire into the uses of the products. We are interested in selling them." This attitude was made clear too by the businessmen who continued to ship scrap metal and oil to Italy, even though the President asked for a voluntary embargo in 1935. In fact, in the last three months of 1935, American oil shipments to Mussolini's Italy tripled. The' isolationists were important watchdogs over American business. We have few watchdogs today, and have moved into the era of conglomerates, with some companies dependent upon military orders and contributing through lobbies to the world's arms race. Some critics of the isolationists have incorrectly interpreted isolationism to mean friendliness toward fascism, or at least a condoning of fascism. The isolationist camp did attract Fascists, but they did not constitute the movement. Indeed, numerous liberal isolationists were early and vociferous in their denunciation of Hitlerism and the persecution of the Jews. Oswald Garrison Villard, for example, in 1933 and 1935 urged Western Europe to boycott Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, and in 1936 appealed to the League of Nations to act against Hitler. Villard became despondent, as did many isolationists, when the other European nations themselves would do nothing to contain the dictators. "The overwhelming majority of all isolationists," Jonas has written, "had no desire to see the Axis Powers gain their ends." The Spanish Civil War was particularly agonizing for liberal Isolationists, and the response of many of them suggests their flexibility and their opposition to fascism. How can one be committed to both peace and liberty? Many isolationists chose liberty, and encouraged the Roosevelt administration to aid the anti-Franco Loyalists. But to their dismay and surprise, the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull performed like strict isolationists by imposing an arms embargo on Spain. Furthermore, Roosevelt followed the lead of the European nonintervention committee, which proved unworkable in the face of German, Italian and Russian intervention. If some Isolationists demonstrated that they would accept selective intervention, as in the Spanish Civil War, others later showed themselves capable of changing their minds over the question of aiding Britain against the rising Germany. Many liberals quit the isolationist ranks in 1939-41, leaving conservatives there, and thus contributing tot the notion that conservatism and isolationism were linked. It should be stated, too, that the isolationists cannot be blamed for the coming of World War II. Germany did not depend upon American isolationism in making its plans. Britain and France let Germany nibble for a number of years, conceding to Fascist demands. Not until April of 1939 did France and Britain guarantee the independence of Poland. The League of Nation was moribund in the 1930s, its members unwilling to take decisive action. The Soviet Union was excluded from membership until 1934 and then ousted In 1939. Germany was admitted to the League in 1926 and departed in 1934. Both Japan and Italy withdrew in the mid-thirties. Britain was more interested in balance of power than collective security. As Robert A. Divine has suggested, European appeasers co-authored the American Neutrality Acts, because some Americans concluded that we had better steer clear of the chaos In Europe. Scholars and politicians have distorted isolationism and confused a useful heritage. We cannot accept the notion of Fortress America; we reject strict unilateralism and the idea of a foreign policy conspiracy. But there is much value in the isolationist argument for freedom of action and limited commitments in foreign relations. This does not mean a rejection of international cooperation and the United Nations. It means simply Independence and freedom of choice. Our alliance arrangements may drag us clumsily into wars. As someone has put It, we have constructed Pearl Harbors throughout the world. We cling to obsolete agreements like NATO which tie us to collapsing military alliances and impede East-West relations. We should give more attention, too, to the isolationist call for nonintervention and self- determination. The isolationist critique is relevant to the senseless war in Vietnam which, among other detriments, has crippled a domestic reform movement. As America moves to the political fight, the isolationist warning of war's effect on civil liberties is Imposing. We might recall, too, that the isolationists worried about the growing and somewhat independent role of the President in foreign affairs. Today Congressmen are questioning the evolution of Presidential commitments in Vietnam without a declaration of war. The "National Commitments Resolution," introduced by Senators Fulbright and Gore, and recently passed by a 70-to-16 vote, expressed the Senate's desire for participation in national security questions. In this day of global diplomacy and worldwide military skirmishes, we might reflect upon the Isolationist critique of the 1930s and its significance to our problems. Surely many Americans share with the isolationists the fear (in the words of Prof. Warren Cohen) "that social democracy may die in the United States if It has to be fostered abroad by force rather than by precept." BACKGROUND OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in terms of flaunting by Government officials of the people's right to know the facts, there has been no period in American history comparable to that of our involvement in Vietnam. From the shoddy disregard of the Geneva accords, through the misrepresentation surrounding passage of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, down to the present-day attempt to pass off the dictatorial Thieu regime as a government which shares our values, the executive branch of the Government has failed-and continues to fail-to come clean with the American public. Throughout this tragic period the Committee on Foreign Relations has attempted to give the public the facts necessary to make informed decisions on the wisdom of Vietnam policy. The latest effort was prompted by a comment by General Westmoreland in a publication issued by the Department of Defense earlier this year, entitled "Report on the War in Vietnam." General Westmoreland, in discussing the circumstances surrounding the sending of the first U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, wrote: It was my estimate that the government of Vietnam could not survive this mounting enemy military and political offensive for more than six months unless the United States chose to increase its military commitment. Substantial numbers of U.S. ground combat forces were required. I realized, as did Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, that the U.S. was faced with a momentous and far-reaching decision. In making my recommendations in the spring and early summer of 1965, as indeed in the case of later recommendations, I was mindful of the stated U.S. objective with respect to Vietnam: "To defeat aggression so that the people of South Vietnam will be free to shape their own destiny." It was my judgment that this end could not be achieved without the deployment of U.S. forces. With the concurrence of Ambassador Taylor, I so recommended. I was struck by the fact that there was no mention by General Westmoreland of a request for U.S. troops from the South Vietnamese Government. General Westmoreland wrote: It was my estimate that the government of Vietnam could not survive ... It was my judgment that [the U.S. objectives] could not be achieved without the deployment of U.S. forces. In an effort to shed light on the point. I wrote to Secretary of State Rogers on May 12 to ask for copies of any request from South Vietnam for U.S. intervention with combat troops. After nearly 4 months deliberation, the Department wrote that there was no request but that- The process of analyzing the situation by the two governments, and the consultation and agreement thereon, were such as to be regarded by our Government as constituting a request from the Government of Vietnam. I suppose I should not be surprised that the Government which viewed the Tonkin Gulf resolution as the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war would send American troops off to fight a land war in Asia without a formal request, for the record, from the government they were being sent to save. Many diplomatic and legal niceties, along with the truth, were early victims of the war. It is shocking to realize that Congress was not asked for specific authority for the sending of American soldiers to South Vietnam and, indeed, that the government of South Vietnam itself did not make a written, formal request for these troops. I ask unanimous consent to have the exchange of correspondence with the Department of State printed in the Record at the end of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, after reviewing the record of official conduct concerning this tragic war, one need not look further to understand the despair and disillusionment over governmental processes that afflict our young people today. Having been indoctrinated throughout their lives that Government decisions are a matter of open covenants, openly arrived at, they have found that, on the contrary, their Government neither gives them the full facts about great public issues nor believes that the public should expect their officials to be candid and honest.
Object Description
Title | Background of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam |
Abstract | Fulbright speech highly critical of the government's failure to fully inform the American public of the facts regarding the United States' involvement in Vietnam. |
Creator | Fulbright, J. William |
Date | September 12, 1969 |
Audience of Speech | U.S. Senate |
Institution Where Speech Was Given | U.S. Senate |
City and State | Washington, D.C. |
Subject |
Vietnam War Domestic Issues American Government Foreign Relations |
Item Location | J. William Fulbright Papers (MS F956 144, Series 71, Box 34, File 40) |
Rights | Please contact Special Collections for information on copyright. |
Digital Publisher | University of Arkansas Libraries |
Series Title | A Calm Voice in a Strident World: Senator J.W. Fulbright Speaks |
Description
Title | Background of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam |
Abstract | Fulbright speech highly critical of the government's failure to fully inform the American public of the facts regarding the United States' involvement in Vietnam. |
Creator | Fulbright, J. William |
Date | September 12, 1969 |
Audience of Speech | U.S. Senate |
Institution Where Speech Was Given | U.S. Senate |
City and State | Washington, D.C. |
Subject |
Vietnam War Domestic Issues American Government Foreign Relations |
Transcript | S10508 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12, 1969 anti-Fasclst. But as Prof. Gabriel Kolko has demonstrated, twenty-six of the top 100 American corporations of 1937 were Involved in significant cartel and contractual agreements with Nazi Germany. And fifty-six American companies were connected with the backbone of Hitler's war machine, the I. G. Farben Company. Standard Oil helped Germany develop both synthetic rubber and 100- octane aviation fuel. Bendix Aviation, controlled by General Motors, as late as 1940 provided a German company (Robert Bosch) with complete data on aircraft and diesel engine starters in return for royalties. As an official of the Dow Chemical Company boldly remarked In the 1930s: "We do not Inquire into the uses of the products. We are interested in selling them." This attitude was made clear too by the businessmen who continued to ship scrap metal and oil to Italy, even though the President asked for a voluntary embargo in 1935. In fact, in the last three months of 1935, American oil shipments to Mussolini's Italy tripled. The' isolationists were important watchdogs over American business. We have few watchdogs today, and have moved into the era of conglomerates, with some companies dependent upon military orders and contributing through lobbies to the world's arms race. Some critics of the isolationists have incorrectly interpreted isolationism to mean friendliness toward fascism, or at least a condoning of fascism. The isolationist camp did attract Fascists, but they did not constitute the movement. Indeed, numerous liberal isolationists were early and vociferous in their denunciation of Hitlerism and the persecution of the Jews. Oswald Garrison Villard, for example, in 1933 and 1935 urged Western Europe to boycott Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, and in 1936 appealed to the League of Nations to act against Hitler. Villard became despondent, as did many isolationists, when the other European nations themselves would do nothing to contain the dictators. "The overwhelming majority of all isolationists," Jonas has written, "had no desire to see the Axis Powers gain their ends." The Spanish Civil War was particularly agonizing for liberal Isolationists, and the response of many of them suggests their flexibility and their opposition to fascism. How can one be committed to both peace and liberty? Many isolationists chose liberty, and encouraged the Roosevelt administration to aid the anti-Franco Loyalists. But to their dismay and surprise, the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull performed like strict isolationists by imposing an arms embargo on Spain. Furthermore, Roosevelt followed the lead of the European nonintervention committee, which proved unworkable in the face of German, Italian and Russian intervention. If some Isolationists demonstrated that they would accept selective intervention, as in the Spanish Civil War, others later showed themselves capable of changing their minds over the question of aiding Britain against the rising Germany. Many liberals quit the isolationist ranks in 1939-41, leaving conservatives there, and thus contributing tot the notion that conservatism and isolationism were linked. It should be stated, too, that the isolationists cannot be blamed for the coming of World War II. Germany did not depend upon American isolationism in making its plans. Britain and France let Germany nibble for a number of years, conceding to Fascist demands. Not until April of 1939 did France and Britain guarantee the independence of Poland. The League of Nation was moribund in the 1930s, its members unwilling to take decisive action. The Soviet Union was excluded from membership until 1934 and then ousted In 1939. Germany was admitted to the League in 1926 and departed in 1934. Both Japan and Italy withdrew in the mid-thirties. Britain was more interested in balance of power than collective security. As Robert A. Divine has suggested, European appeasers co-authored the American Neutrality Acts, because some Americans concluded that we had better steer clear of the chaos In Europe. Scholars and politicians have distorted isolationism and confused a useful heritage. We cannot accept the notion of Fortress America; we reject strict unilateralism and the idea of a foreign policy conspiracy. But there is much value in the isolationist argument for freedom of action and limited commitments in foreign relations. This does not mean a rejection of international cooperation and the United Nations. It means simply Independence and freedom of choice. Our alliance arrangements may drag us clumsily into wars. As someone has put It, we have constructed Pearl Harbors throughout the world. We cling to obsolete agreements like NATO which tie us to collapsing military alliances and impede East-West relations. We should give more attention, too, to the isolationist call for nonintervention and self- determination. The isolationist critique is relevant to the senseless war in Vietnam which, among other detriments, has crippled a domestic reform movement. As America moves to the political fight, the isolationist warning of war's effect on civil liberties is Imposing. We might recall, too, that the isolationists worried about the growing and somewhat independent role of the President in foreign affairs. Today Congressmen are questioning the evolution of Presidential commitments in Vietnam without a declaration of war. The "National Commitments Resolution," introduced by Senators Fulbright and Gore, and recently passed by a 70-to-16 vote, expressed the Senate's desire for participation in national security questions. In this day of global diplomacy and worldwide military skirmishes, we might reflect upon the Isolationist critique of the 1930s and its significance to our problems. Surely many Americans share with the isolationists the fear (in the words of Prof. Warren Cohen) "that social democracy may die in the United States if It has to be fostered abroad by force rather than by precept." BACKGROUND OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in terms of flaunting by Government officials of the people's right to know the facts, there has been no period in American history comparable to that of our involvement in Vietnam. From the shoddy disregard of the Geneva accords, through the misrepresentation surrounding passage of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, down to the present-day attempt to pass off the dictatorial Thieu regime as a government which shares our values, the executive branch of the Government has failed-and continues to fail-to come clean with the American public. Throughout this tragic period the Committee on Foreign Relations has attempted to give the public the facts necessary to make informed decisions on the wisdom of Vietnam policy. The latest effort was prompted by a comment by General Westmoreland in a publication issued by the Department of Defense earlier this year, entitled "Report on the War in Vietnam." General Westmoreland, in discussing the circumstances surrounding the sending of the first U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, wrote: It was my estimate that the government of Vietnam could not survive this mounting enemy military and political offensive for more than six months unless the United States chose to increase its military commitment. Substantial numbers of U.S. ground combat forces were required. I realized, as did Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, that the U.S. was faced with a momentous and far-reaching decision. In making my recommendations in the spring and early summer of 1965, as indeed in the case of later recommendations, I was mindful of the stated U.S. objective with respect to Vietnam: "To defeat aggression so that the people of South Vietnam will be free to shape their own destiny." It was my judgment that this end could not be achieved without the deployment of U.S. forces. With the concurrence of Ambassador Taylor, I so recommended. I was struck by the fact that there was no mention by General Westmoreland of a request for U.S. troops from the South Vietnamese Government. General Westmoreland wrote: It was my estimate that the government of Vietnam could not survive ... It was my judgment that [the U.S. objectives] could not be achieved without the deployment of U.S. forces. In an effort to shed light on the point. I wrote to Secretary of State Rogers on May 12 to ask for copies of any request from South Vietnam for U.S. intervention with combat troops. After nearly 4 months deliberation, the Department wrote that there was no request but that- The process of analyzing the situation by the two governments, and the consultation and agreement thereon, were such as to be regarded by our Government as constituting a request from the Government of Vietnam. I suppose I should not be surprised that the Government which viewed the Tonkin Gulf resolution as the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war would send American troops off to fight a land war in Asia without a formal request, for the record, from the government they were being sent to save. Many diplomatic and legal niceties, along with the truth, were early victims of the war. It is shocking to realize that Congress was not asked for specific authority for the sending of American soldiers to South Vietnam and, indeed, that the government of South Vietnam itself did not make a written, formal request for these troops. I ask unanimous consent to have the exchange of correspondence with the Department of State printed in the Record at the end of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, after reviewing the record of official conduct concerning this tragic war, one need not look further to understand the despair and disillusionment over governmental processes that afflict our young people today. Having been indoctrinated throughout their lives that Government decisions are a matter of open covenants, openly arrived at, they have found that, on the contrary, their Government neither gives them the full facts about great public issues nor believes that the public should expect their officials to be candid and honest. |
Item Location | J. William Fulbright Papers (MS F956 144, Series 71, Box 34, File 40) |
Rights | Please contact Special Collections for information on copyright. |
Digital Publisher | University of Arkansas Libraries |
Series Title | A Calm Voice in a Strident World: Senator J.W. Fulbright Speaks |
Tags
Comments
Post a Comment for Background of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam