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S14016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE November 10, 1969 from the remainder of the agencies on budget, estimates as well as requested restorations. The committee also heard statements from numerous public witnesses on various subjects and concluded the hearings on July 22. At that time it was the intention of the committee to report the bill promptly, with the hope that the bill could be finally enacted in the comparatively early days of the new fiscal year beginning on July 1. The good intentions of the committee have been hopelessly stymied month after month after month by the failure of the legislative committees to act upon three authorizations which are essential to the consideration by the committee of the funding required for those agencies in the bill—National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation,and Appalachian Development Act. The real victims of this frustrating delay are the other agencies in the bill that do not require annual authorization. Personnel and funding restrictions in recent years have held them back, including the continuing resolution, and they must await the enactment of the bill for any relief in the way of new authority. CONTRACT AUTHORITY The Appropriations Committee takes note that a practice is developing which it feels is unwise and economically inadvisable; namely, the granting of contract authority by various legislative committees without consultation with the Appropriations Committee as to what ultimate effect this might have on our fiscal stability. We would hope that the Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for all Federal appropriations, would not be denied through this process the opportunity and the jurisdiction of determining the funding process of the Senate. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this is what we say: The real victims of this frustrating delay are the other agencies in the bill that do not require annual authorization. Personnel and funding restrictions in recent years have held them back, including the continuing resolution, and they must await the enactment of the bill for any relief in the way of new authority. Then, of course, speaking on this question about the contract authority, our committee is pretty much irked over the procedure taking place, because we feel, there again, that is not the proper way for the Senate and the Congress to proceed. This is what we say: The Appropriations Committee takes note that a practice is developing which it feels is unwise and economically inadvisable; namely, the granting of contract authority by various legislative committees without consultation with the Appropriations Committee as to what ultimate effect this might have on our fiscal stability. We would hope that the Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for all Federal appropriations, would not be denied through this process the opportunity and the jurisdiction of determining the funding process of the Senate. Mr. President, my colleague from Colorado and I both feel very strongly about this, and so does the whole committee. I thought I would point that out again, with no impertinence, that it should be called to the attention of the Senate. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR HATFIELD TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon (Mr. Hatfield) be recognized for not to exceed 45 minutes tomorrow at the conclusion of the morning business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. RECESS Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 5 minutes of 2 today. There being no objection, at 1 o'clock and 36 minutes the Senate recessed until 1 o'clock and 55 minutes, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Mansfield in the chair). Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inouye in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered. TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in recent years it has become distressingly apparent that there is often a great discrepancy between the facts of a given international crisis and the image of them as presented by the executive branch to the American public and Congress. This may be attributed in part to the increasing complexity of our foreign relations. Upon closer examination, however, other, deeply disturbing, explanations are revealed. Foremost among these is an increasing tendency on the part of the executive branch policymakers to make arbitrary decisions regarding what the public needs, or has a right to know. In some instances, it is difficult, if not impossible to avoid the conclusion that the "facts" selected for public revelation have been chosen with an eye to their utility in justifying actions contemplated or, indeed, already taken. There are, to be sure, certain restraints which inhibit this practice: the greater the body of openly available information, the greater the difficulty in staging selective presentations. When all the pertinent evidence of a highly classified intelligence nature, as was the case in the events in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2 and August 4, 1964, is in the hands of the policymakers, however, the public and Congress are relatively helpless. An even more serious aspect of such situations is the degree to which the highest policymakers themselves may be in the hands of intelligence technicians and managers operating without policy guidance or responsibility. This problem has been carefully documented in the recently published book "Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair" by Mr. Joseph C. Goulden. There is no single piece of writing on this subject which I could commend more highly to my colleagues as we struggle to extricate ourselves from the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf affair and to assess the implications of the secret war in Laos. Mr. Goulden's book has already received widespread and highly favorable recognition in book reviews and news articles. I ask unanimous consent that these items be printed in the Record, There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9. 1969] The Big Question: What Happened? (By Jim Wright) In trying to evaluate our entry to the Vietnam War, one of the first steps—and one of the hardest—is trying to find out what happened. A new book, just out, is the result of an expert's attempt to find out what happened during the two confusing days in the summer of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the writing business, the experts at finding out what actually happened are the reporters. Author Joe Goulden, who once worked in that capacity for The News, was and is an excellent reporter, skilled at digging up facts, interviewing witnesses, comparing stories and giving an account of events that sorts out fact from rumor or opinion. His efforts to find out what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin have produced "Truth Is the First Casualty" (Rand-McNally, $6.95). In his conclusions, Goulden makes it clear that he believes the Johnson administration's actions during the incident were a "medley of misrepresentations, contradictions and half-truths." But what lifts this book far above the mass of works on Vietnam is that the text is aimed primarily at getting the facts and letting them speak for themselves. Goulden did not try to slant or choose his facts to project any particular line, hawk or dove, liberal or conservative. He just reported them, allowing the reader to form his own conclusions which may be somewhat different from Goulden's. The combination of exhaustive research and objectivity in presenting the results has drawn praise from such disparate sources as the leading dove, Sen. Fulbright, and Holmes Alexander, syndicated conservative columnist. If anything is clear about the incidents of Aug. 4, 1964, it is the lack of clarity in the reports back to the States on what happened. On Aug. 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol through an area in which the South Vietnamese had recently staged commando raids, intercepted radio messages indicating that the North Vietnamese intended hostile action against the ship. When three Red PT boats approached the Maddox in what appeared to be a high-speed torpedo attack, the destroyer fired three "warning shots." Then, when the boats launched torpedoes, she opened fire with her main batteries, hitting one boat. The air cover called in damaged the other two boats. The Maddox left the area, but was ordered back and two days later, accompanied by the Turner Joy, patrolled the waters off North
Object Description
Title | Truth Is The First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair |
Abstract | Fulbright speech describing the misrepresentations of the Executive Branch in its presentations to the American public and to Congress regarding events in Vietnam. |
Creator | Fulbright, J. William |
Date | November 10, 1969 |
Audience of Speech | U.S. Senate |
Institution Where Speech Was Given | U.S. Senate |
City and State | Washington, D.C. |
Subject |
Vietnam War Gulf of Tonkin Executive Privilege |
Item Location | J. William Fulbright Papers (MS F956 144, Series 71, Box 35, File 11) |
Rights | Please contact Special Collections for information on copyright. |
Digital Publisher | University of Arkansas Libraries |
Series Title | A Calm Voice in a Strident World: Senator J.W. Fulbright Speaks |
Description
Title | Truth Is The First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair |
Abstract | Fulbright speech describing the misrepresentations of the Executive Branch in its presentations to the American public and to Congress regarding events in Vietnam. |
Creator | Fulbright, J. William |
Date | November 10, 1969 |
Audience of Speech | U.S. Senate |
Institution Where Speech Was Given | U.S. Senate |
City and State | Washington, D.C. |
Subject |
Vietnam War Gulf of Tonkin Executive Privilege |
Transcript | S14016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE November 10, 1969 from the remainder of the agencies on budget, estimates as well as requested restorations. The committee also heard statements from numerous public witnesses on various subjects and concluded the hearings on July 22. At that time it was the intention of the committee to report the bill promptly, with the hope that the bill could be finally enacted in the comparatively early days of the new fiscal year beginning on July 1. The good intentions of the committee have been hopelessly stymied month after month after month by the failure of the legislative committees to act upon three authorizations which are essential to the consideration by the committee of the funding required for those agencies in the bill—National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation,and Appalachian Development Act. The real victims of this frustrating delay are the other agencies in the bill that do not require annual authorization. Personnel and funding restrictions in recent years have held them back, including the continuing resolution, and they must await the enactment of the bill for any relief in the way of new authority. CONTRACT AUTHORITY The Appropriations Committee takes note that a practice is developing which it feels is unwise and economically inadvisable; namely, the granting of contract authority by various legislative committees without consultation with the Appropriations Committee as to what ultimate effect this might have on our fiscal stability. We would hope that the Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for all Federal appropriations, would not be denied through this process the opportunity and the jurisdiction of determining the funding process of the Senate. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this is what we say: The real victims of this frustrating delay are the other agencies in the bill that do not require annual authorization. Personnel and funding restrictions in recent years have held them back, including the continuing resolution, and they must await the enactment of the bill for any relief in the way of new authority. Then, of course, speaking on this question about the contract authority, our committee is pretty much irked over the procedure taking place, because we feel, there again, that is not the proper way for the Senate and the Congress to proceed. This is what we say: The Appropriations Committee takes note that a practice is developing which it feels is unwise and economically inadvisable; namely, the granting of contract authority by various legislative committees without consultation with the Appropriations Committee as to what ultimate effect this might have on our fiscal stability. We would hope that the Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for all Federal appropriations, would not be denied through this process the opportunity and the jurisdiction of determining the funding process of the Senate. Mr. President, my colleague from Colorado and I both feel very strongly about this, and so does the whole committee. I thought I would point that out again, with no impertinence, that it should be called to the attention of the Senate. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR HATFIELD TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon (Mr. Hatfield) be recognized for not to exceed 45 minutes tomorrow at the conclusion of the morning business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. RECESS Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 5 minutes of 2 today. There being no objection, at 1 o'clock and 36 minutes the Senate recessed until 1 o'clock and 55 minutes, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Mansfield in the chair). Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inouye in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered. TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in recent years it has become distressingly apparent that there is often a great discrepancy between the facts of a given international crisis and the image of them as presented by the executive branch to the American public and Congress. This may be attributed in part to the increasing complexity of our foreign relations. Upon closer examination, however, other, deeply disturbing, explanations are revealed. Foremost among these is an increasing tendency on the part of the executive branch policymakers to make arbitrary decisions regarding what the public needs, or has a right to know. In some instances, it is difficult, if not impossible to avoid the conclusion that the "facts" selected for public revelation have been chosen with an eye to their utility in justifying actions contemplated or, indeed, already taken. There are, to be sure, certain restraints which inhibit this practice: the greater the body of openly available information, the greater the difficulty in staging selective presentations. When all the pertinent evidence of a highly classified intelligence nature, as was the case in the events in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2 and August 4, 1964, is in the hands of the policymakers, however, the public and Congress are relatively helpless. An even more serious aspect of such situations is the degree to which the highest policymakers themselves may be in the hands of intelligence technicians and managers operating without policy guidance or responsibility. This problem has been carefully documented in the recently published book "Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair" by Mr. Joseph C. Goulden. There is no single piece of writing on this subject which I could commend more highly to my colleagues as we struggle to extricate ourselves from the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf affair and to assess the implications of the secret war in Laos. Mr. Goulden's book has already received widespread and highly favorable recognition in book reviews and news articles. I ask unanimous consent that these items be printed in the Record, There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9. 1969] The Big Question: What Happened? (By Jim Wright) In trying to evaluate our entry to the Vietnam War, one of the first steps—and one of the hardest—is trying to find out what happened. A new book, just out, is the result of an expert's attempt to find out what happened during the two confusing days in the summer of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the writing business, the experts at finding out what actually happened are the reporters. Author Joe Goulden, who once worked in that capacity for The News, was and is an excellent reporter, skilled at digging up facts, interviewing witnesses, comparing stories and giving an account of events that sorts out fact from rumor or opinion. His efforts to find out what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin have produced "Truth Is the First Casualty" (Rand-McNally, $6.95). In his conclusions, Goulden makes it clear that he believes the Johnson administration's actions during the incident were a "medley of misrepresentations, contradictions and half-truths." But what lifts this book far above the mass of works on Vietnam is that the text is aimed primarily at getting the facts and letting them speak for themselves. Goulden did not try to slant or choose his facts to project any particular line, hawk or dove, liberal or conservative. He just reported them, allowing the reader to form his own conclusions which may be somewhat different from Goulden's. The combination of exhaustive research and objectivity in presenting the results has drawn praise from such disparate sources as the leading dove, Sen. Fulbright, and Holmes Alexander, syndicated conservative columnist. If anything is clear about the incidents of Aug. 4, 1964, it is the lack of clarity in the reports back to the States on what happened. On Aug. 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol through an area in which the South Vietnamese had recently staged commando raids, intercepted radio messages indicating that the North Vietnamese intended hostile action against the ship. When three Red PT boats approached the Maddox in what appeared to be a high-speed torpedo attack, the destroyer fired three "warning shots." Then, when the boats launched torpedoes, she opened fire with her main batteries, hitting one boat. The air cover called in damaged the other two boats. The Maddox left the area, but was ordered back and two days later, accompanied by the Turner Joy, patrolled the waters off North |
Item Location | J. William Fulbright Papers (MS F956 144, Series 71, Box 35, File 11) |
Rights | Please contact Special Collections for information on copyright. |
Digital Publisher | University of Arkansas Libraries |
Series Title | A Calm Voice in a Strident World: Senator J.W. Fulbright Speaks |
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