S14016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE	November 10, 1969

from the remainder of the agencies on 
budget, estimates as well as requested 
restorations. The committee also heard 
statements from numerous public witnesses on 
various subjects and concluded the hearings 
on July 22.
At that time it was the intention of the 
committee to report the bill promptly, with 
the hope that the bill could be finally enacted in the comparatively early days of 
the new fiscal year beginning on July 1.
The good intentions of the committee have 
been hopelessly stymied month after month 
after month by the failure of the legislative 
committees to act upon three authorizations 
which are essential to the consideration by 
the committee of the funding required for 
those agencies in the bill—National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, National 
Science Foundation,and Appalachian Development Act.
The real victims of this frustrating delay 
are the other agencies in the bill that do 
not require annual authorization. Personnel 
and funding restrictions in recent years have 
held them back, including the continuing 
resolution, and they must await the 
enactment of the bill for any relief in the way 
of new authority.

CONTRACT AUTHORITY

The Appropriations Committee takes note 
that a practice is developing which it feels 
is unwise and economically inadvisable; 
namely, the granting of contract authority 
by various legislative committees without 
consultation with the Appropriations 
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might 
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope 
that the Appropriations Committee, which is 
responsible for all Federal appropriations, 
would not be denied through this process 
the opportunity and the jurisdiction of 
determining the funding process of the Senate.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this is 
what we say:
The real victims of this frustrating delay 
are the other agencies in the bill that do not 
require annual authorization. Personnel and 
funding restrictions in recent years have held 
them back, including the continuing 
resolution, and they must await the enactment of 
the bill for any relief in the way of new 
authority.
Then, of course, speaking on this 
question about the contract authority, 
our committee is pretty much irked over 
the procedure taking place, because we 
feel, there again, that is not the proper 
way for the Senate and the Congress to 
proceed.
This is what we say:
The Appropriations Committee takes note 
that a practice is developing which it feels is 
unwise and economically inadvisable; 
namely, the granting of contract authority 
by various legislative committees without 
consultation with the Appropriations 
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might 
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope 
that the Appropriations Committee, which 
is responsible for all Federal appropriations, 
would not be denied through this process the 
opportunity and the jurisdiction of 
determining the funding process of the Senate.
Mr. President, my colleague from 
Colorado and I both feel very strongly 
about this, and so does the whole 
committee.
I thought I would point that out again, 
with no impertinence, that it should be 
called to the attention of the Senate.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk 
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk 
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF 
SENATOR HATFIELD TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the 
distinguished senior Senator from Oregon 
(Mr. Hatfield) be recognized for not to 
exceed 45 minutes tomorrow at the conclusion 
of the morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate stand 
in recess until 5 minutes of 2 today.
There being no objection, at 1 o'clock 
and 36 minutes the Senate recessed until 
1 o'clock and 55 minutes, when called to 
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. 
Mansfield in the chair).
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk 
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
Inouye in the chair). Without objection, 
it is so ordered.

TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY:
THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in 
recent years it has become distressingly 
apparent that there is often a great 
discrepancy between the facts of a given 
international crisis and the image of 
them as presented by the executive 
branch to the American public and Congress. 
This may be attributed in part to 
the increasing complexity of our 
foreign relations. Upon closer examination, 
however, other, deeply disturbing, 
explanations are revealed. Foremost among 
these is an increasing tendency on the 
part of the executive branch policymakers 
to make arbitrary decisions regarding 
what the public needs, or has a right to 
know. In some instances, it is difficult, 
if not impossible to avoid the conclusion 
that the "facts" selected for public 
revelation have been chosen with an eye to 
their utility in justifying actions 
contemplated or, indeed, already taken.
There are, to be sure, certain restraints 
which inhibit this practice: the greater 
the body of openly available information, 
the greater the difficulty in staging 
selective presentations. When all the 
pertinent evidence of a highly classified 
intelligence nature, as was the case in the 
events in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2 
and August 4, 1964, is in the hands of the 
policymakers, however, the public and 
Congress are relatively helpless.
An even more serious aspect of such 
situations is the degree to which the
highest policymakers themselves may be 
in the hands of intelligence technicians 
and managers operating without policy 
guidance or responsibility.
This problem has been carefully 
documented in the recently published book 
"Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf 
of Tonkin Affair" by Mr. Joseph C. 
Goulden. There is no single piece of 
writing on this subject which I could 
commend more highly to my colleagues as 
we struggle to extricate ourselves from 
the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf 
affair and to assess the implications of 
the secret war in Laos.
Mr. Goulden's book has already 
received widespread and highly favorable 
recognition in book reviews and news 
articles. I ask unanimous consent that 
these items be printed in the Record,
There being no objection, the material 
was ordered to be printed in the Record, 
as follows:

[From the Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9.
1969]
The Big Question: What Happened?
(By Jim Wright)

In trying to evaluate our entry to the 
Vietnam War, one of the first steps—and 
one of the hardest—is trying to find out 
what happened.
A new book, just out, is the result of an 
expert's attempt to find out what happened 
during the two confusing days in the 
summer of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the 
writing business, the experts at finding out 
what actually happened are the reporters.
Author Joe Goulden, who once worked in 
that capacity for The News, was and is an 
excellent reporter, skilled at digging up facts, 
interviewing witnesses, comparing stories and 
giving an account of events that sorts out 
fact from rumor or opinion.
His efforts to find out what happened in 
the Gulf of Tonkin have produced "Truth 
Is the First Casualty" (Rand-McNally, $6.95). 
In his conclusions, Goulden makes it clear 
that he believes the Johnson administration's 
actions during the incident were a 
"medley of misrepresentations, contradictions 
and half-truths."
But what lifts this book far above the 
mass of works on Vietnam is that the text is 
aimed primarily at getting the facts and 
letting them speak for themselves.
Goulden did not try to slant or choose his 
facts to project any particular line, hawk or 
dove, liberal or conservative. He just reported 
them, allowing the reader to form his own 
conclusions which may be somewhat different 
from Goulden's.
The combination of exhaustive research 
and objectivity in presenting the results has 
drawn praise from such disparate sources as 
the leading dove, Sen. Fulbright, and Holmes 
Alexander, syndicated conservative columnist.
If anything is clear about the incidents 
of Aug. 4, 1964, it is the lack of clarity in 
the reports back to the States on what 
happened.
On Aug. 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol 
through an area in which the South Vietnamese 
had recently staged commando raids, 
intercepted radio messages indicating that 
the North Vietnamese intended hostile 
action against the ship.
When three Red PT boats approached the 
Maddox in what appeared to be a high-speed 
torpedo attack, the destroyer fired three 
"warning shots." Then, when the boats 
launched torpedoes, she opened fire with her 
main batteries, hitting one boat. The air 
cover called in damaged the other two boats.
The Maddox left the area, but was ordered 
back and two days later, accompanied by the 
Turner Joy, patrolled the waters off North