2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
Mexico City was one of the few
instances in the history of this Nation that
the practice of advice, as well as consent,
has been observed in the strict sense,
which was meant by the makers of our
Constitution. The last time of any
importance was in 1846, nearly 100 years
ago. The question of the Oregon
boundary dispute had become a political issue
in the Presidential contest, along with
that of the annexation of Texas. James
K. Polk was elected on a platform which
demanded a settlement epitomized in the
campaign slogan of the Democrats,
"Fifty-four forty or fight." In the
course of the subsequent negotiations
President Polk sought and received in
advance the advice of the full Senate
itself, not upon the matter of
ratification—since there was nothing to ratify—
but upon the formulation in detail of the
treaty which was eventually adopted.
At Mexico City, judging from the
newspaper report to which I have referred,
Members of the Senate were consulted in
advance of the Act of Chapultepec and
aided mightily in the formulation of that
act. We have to go back a hundred
years for a precedent to this historic
proceeding—a proceeding which, as I say,
was envisaged by the Constitution-
makers when they wrote the advice-and-
consent clause into our Constitution.
It seems to me most urgent, Mr. President,
that this body should proceed, in
the near future, to the consideration of
the basic principles of our foreign policy.
The time is drawing near when the great
decisions must be made. Unless some
means is found to clarify beforehand
many of the issues involved in these
decisions, then necessarily, our representatives
will be forced to improvise in the
dark and by guesswork.
For example, there is a common
belief, perhaps a myth, that our people are
anti-British. There are several powerful
newspapers in this country which for
many years have drilled into the minds
of their millions of readers hate and distrust
of the British. The same newspapers
and other papers have done
likewise with regard to the Russians, the
Jews, and, for that matter, all
"furriners," as one governor of a sovereign
State used to put it. I do not believe the
majority of our people, or the majority
of the Senate, subscribes to these narrow
prejudices. However, if these matters
were clearly and reasonably discussed,
along with other matters of similar
importance, I think it would do much to
reassure our allies in the United Nations
and to strengthen the courage of our own
representatives. On the other hand, if
it be true, which I cannot believe, that
we do hate and distrust our allies, then
we and they should know about it. If
these powerful influences in our press
have so far poisoned the minds of our
people that they do not desire to
cooperate positively and concretely with our
allies, then an entirely different policy
from that now proposed should be
pursued.
I think that a thorough examination
on the floor of the Senate of the history
of our relations with Great Britain would
do more than all the treaties in the world
to strengthen our relations. The American
people should be told by their
Senators why it is that twice in 25 years we
have been drawn into a war on the side
of Britain and France and Russia. Upon
examination it might appear that we
have entered both these wars for excellent
and compelling reasons rather than
because of the trickery and ambition of
the British, as the Chicago Tribune would
have us believe. It may be that we
entered these wars because it was the only
possible way to preserve our very freedom
and independence, about which even the
Tribune professes concern. It could be
that we were influenced by the fact that
our basic institutions, our common law,
our ideas of justice, and the dignity of
the individual human being were derived
to a great extent from the British, the
French, the Greeks, and the Jews. It
might be that the fact we are a Christian
people influenced us when it was a choice
between subservience, if not slavery, to
the ruthless paganism of the Germans,
or war in support of other Christian
peoples. The similarity of the moral
standards of our peoples, the love of
family, the regard for contractual obligations,
the abhorrence of torture and
persecution, the distrust of a tyrannical
and oppressive government—all of these
considerations may have led us instinctively
to the making of these decisions.
If it be true that reasons of this character
did and do exist, then we should
acknowledge them in order that a definite
policy based upon sound and true
consideration be firmly adopted. These
things do not happen just by chance.
There surely are good reasons, and all
of us and all the people should know them.
Further, it should be made clear to
our people that in entering an
international organization we are doing so not
because of charity or because we love
the British, the French, the Chinese, or
the Russians. If there is reason for doing
it, it is because it is for our own national
self-interest. We have more to lose from
chaos and more to gain from the pursuits
of peace than any other people.
We must recognize from the outset that
to make such an organization work will
require our best brains, much patience,
and much of our worldly goods. We
must be convinced, however, that it will
require less of all of these things to make
peace than to have another war, or it
obviously would not be a good bargain.
Mr. President, I believe that the
American people are profoundly interested,
and I know that I am deeply interested,
in understanding the what and the why
of our foreign policy, if any. Since I
have been a Member of this body, relatively
little time has been spent upon
this subject. In the hope that I may
promote discussions and criticisms, out
of which better understanding may
evolve, I am venturing a few observations.
During the past several years I have
heard various people say that we have
had no recognizable foreign policy. I
am inclined to agree. By policy is meant
"a settled or definite course or plan
adopted or followed by the Government."
To be definite and settled is of
the essence of policy. To be definite the
men responsible for carrying out a
policy must know what they are doing and
why they are doing it, or it is not
definite. To be settled this knowledge must
flow from a responsible source, in our
case the people of this country, or it
cannot be settled.
Prior to the First World War, in spite
of some wavering from time to time, our
policy was that of isolation. It was
settled and definite. It was justified by the
remoteness of our land from comparable
great powers and was in accord with the
wishes of our people. Our ancestors had
come here with the express purpose of
getting away from the oppression and
disturbances of the Old World. The First
World War unsettled that policy.
President Wilson and others sensed the fact
that isolation had become in fact
impossible, but they were unable to
control the Government. The habits and
prejudices of more than a century were
too strong, even for the obvious
implications of modern science, as exemplified
by the motor car, the airplane, and the
radio. The abortive effort of Wilson to
adjust our policy to the new conditions
of the world, by means of the League of
Nations, left our people divided and
unable to agree upon any policy. We knew
neither what we were doing nor why.
Instead of having a policy, we improvised
upon considerations of the moment.
We declined to join the League and
use our power and influence collectively,
to establish order and peace. On the
other hand we participated in
disarmament conferences and proceeded to
weaken our armed forces. We had
neither force, nor collective security, to
protect us. At the peace conference we
insisted upon further fragmentation of
an already chaotic political structure and
at the same time refused to erect any
responsible authority to protect our
handiwork. We insisted upon the
collection of war debts and at the same
time erected tariff barriers which made
such payment impossible. We made
pious declarations against war in the
Kellogg Pact and yet did nothing
concrete when Manchuria and Ethiopia were
invaded. Our Ambassadors reported
preparations for war in Germany and
Japan long before 19S9, yet we continued
to sell materials of war. We passed a
neutrality act which was more to the
benefit of our enemies than our friends;
and so, not long thereafter, we had
to transfer 50 destroyers to Great Britain.
If there was anything definite or settled
about our course of conduct, I am unable t
o see it.
Our floundering and purposeless
conduct during this period was due, I
be¬lieve, to the fact that, as a nation, we
did not understand our proper role in the
world and had failed to examine and
agree upon certain basic convictions
which are essential to any policy.
Although we had done more than any
other nation to develop the scientific
technology which destroyed our
isolation, we refused to acknowledge the
result. We were unable to disentangle our
prejudices and superficial dislikes from
Fulbright Speeches
