2             CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Mexico City was one of the few 
instances in the history of this Nation that
 the practice of advice, as well as consent, 
has been observed in the strict sense, 
which was meant by the makers of our 
Constitution. The last time of any 
importance was in 1846, nearly 100 years 
ago. The question of the Oregon 
boundary dispute had become a political issue 
in the Presidential contest, along with 
that of the annexation of Texas. James 
K. Polk was elected on a platform which 
demanded a settlement epitomized in the 
campaign slogan of the Democrats, 
"Fifty-four forty or fight." In the 
course of the subsequent negotiations 
President Polk sought and received in 
advance the advice of the full Senate 
itself, not upon the matter of 
ratification—since there was nothing to ratify— 
but upon the formulation in detail of the 
treaty which was eventually adopted. 
At Mexico City, judging from the 
newspaper report to which I have referred, 
Members of the Senate were consulted in 
advance of the Act of Chapultepec and 
aided mightily in the formulation of that 
act. We have to go back a hundred 
years for a precedent to this historic 
proceeding—a proceeding which, as I say, 
was envisaged by the Constitution- 
makers when they wrote the advice-and- 
consent clause into our Constitution.
It seems to me most urgent, Mr. President, 
that this body should proceed, in 
the near future, to the consideration of 
the basic principles of our foreign policy. 
The time is drawing near when the great 
decisions must be made. Unless some 
means is found to clarify beforehand 
many of the issues involved in these 
decisions, then necessarily, our representatives 
will be forced to improvise in the 
dark and by guesswork.
For example, there is a common 
belief, perhaps a myth, that our people are 
anti-British. There are several powerful 
newspapers in this country which for 
many years have drilled into the minds 
of their millions of readers hate and distrust 
of the British. The same newspapers 
and other papers have done 
likewise with regard to the Russians, the 
Jews, and, for that matter, all 
"furriners," as one governor of a sovereign 
State used to put it. I do not believe the 
majority of our people, or the majority 
of the Senate, subscribes to these narrow 
prejudices. However, if these matters 
were clearly and reasonably discussed, 
along with other matters of similar 
importance, I think it would do much to 
reassure our allies in the United Nations 
and to strengthen the courage of our own 
representatives. On the other hand, if 
it be true, which I cannot believe, that 
we do hate and distrust our allies, then 
we and they should know about it. If 
these powerful influences in our press 
have so far poisoned the minds of our 
people that they do not desire to 
cooperate positively and concretely with our 
allies, then an entirely different policy 
from that now proposed should be 
pursued.
I think that a thorough examination 
on the floor of the Senate of the history 
of our relations with Great Britain would
do more than all the treaties in the world 
to strengthen our relations. The American 
people should be told by their 
Senators why it is that twice in 25 years we 
have been drawn into a war on the side 
of Britain and France and Russia. Upon 
examination it might appear that we 
have entered both these wars for excellent 
and compelling reasons rather than 
because of the trickery and ambition of 
the British, as the Chicago Tribune would 
have us believe. It may be that we 
entered these wars because it was the only 
possible way to preserve our very freedom 
and independence, about which even the 
Tribune professes concern. It could be 
that we were influenced by the fact that 
our basic institutions, our common law, 
our ideas of justice, and the dignity of 
the individual human being were derived 
to a great extent from the British, the 
French, the Greeks, and the Jews. It 
might be that the fact we are a Christian 
people influenced us when it was a choice 
between subservience, if not slavery, to 
the ruthless paganism of the Germans, 
or war in support of other Christian 
peoples. The similarity of the moral 
standards of our peoples, the love of 
family, the regard for contractual obligations, 
the abhorrence of torture and 
persecution, the distrust of a tyrannical 
and oppressive government—all of these 
considerations may have led us instinctively 
to the making of these decisions. 
If it be true that reasons of this character 
did and do exist, then we should 
acknowledge them in order that a definite 
policy based upon sound and true 
consideration be firmly adopted. These 
things do not happen just by chance. 
There surely are good reasons, and all 
of us and all the people should know them.
Further, it should be made clear to 
our people that in entering an 
international organization we are doing so not 
because of charity or because we love 
the British, the French, the Chinese, or 
the Russians. If there is reason for doing 
it, it is because it is for our own national 
self-interest. We have more to lose from 
chaos and more to gain from the pursuits 
of peace than any other people. 
We must recognize from the outset that 
to make such an organization work will 
require our best brains, much patience, 
and much of our worldly goods. We 
must be convinced, however, that it will 
require less of all of these things to make 
peace than to have another war, or it 
obviously would not be a good bargain.
Mr. President, I believe that the 
American people are profoundly interested, 
and I know that I am deeply interested, 
in understanding the what and the why 
of our foreign policy, if any. Since I 
have been a Member of this body, relatively 
little time has been spent upon 
this subject. In the hope that I may 
promote discussions and criticisms, out 
of which better understanding may 
evolve, I am venturing a few observations.
During the past several years I have 
heard various people say that we have 
had no recognizable foreign policy. I 
am inclined to agree. By policy is meant 
"a settled or definite course or plan 
adopted or followed by the Government." 
To be definite and settled is of 
the essence of policy. To be definite the 
men responsible for carrying out a 
policy must know what they are doing and 
why they are doing it, or it is not 
definite. To be settled this knowledge must 
flow from a responsible source, in our 
case the people of this country, or it 
cannot be settled.
Prior to the First World War, in spite 
of some wavering from time to time, our 
policy was that of isolation. It was 
settled and definite. It was justified by the 
remoteness of our land from comparable 
great powers and was in accord with the 
wishes of our people. Our ancestors had 
come here with the express purpose of 
getting away from the oppression and 
disturbances of the Old World. The First 
World War unsettled that policy. 
President Wilson and others sensed the fact 
that isolation had become in fact 
impossible, but they were unable to 
control the Government. The habits and 
prejudices of more than a century were 
too strong, even for the obvious 
implications of modern science, as exemplified 
by the motor car, the airplane, and the 
radio. The abortive effort of Wilson to 
adjust our policy to the new conditions 
of the world, by means of the League of 
Nations, left our people divided and 
unable to agree upon any policy. We knew 
neither what we were doing nor why. 
Instead of having a policy, we improvised 
upon considerations of the moment.
We declined to join the League and 
use our power and influence collectively, 
to establish order and peace. On the 
other hand we participated in 
disarmament conferences and proceeded to 
weaken our armed forces. We had 
neither force, nor collective security, to 
protect us. At the peace conference we 
insisted upon further fragmentation of 
an already chaotic political structure and 
at the same time refused to erect any 
responsible authority to protect our 
handiwork. We insisted upon the 
collection of war debts and at the same 
time erected tariff barriers which made 
such payment impossible. We made 
pious declarations against war in the 
Kellogg Pact and yet did nothing 
concrete when Manchuria and Ethiopia were 
invaded. Our Ambassadors reported 
preparations for war in Germany and 
Japan long before 19S9, yet we continued 
to sell materials of war. We passed a 
neutrality act which was more to the 
benefit of our enemies than our friends; 
and so, not long thereafter, we had 
to transfer 50 destroyers to Great Britain. 
If there was anything definite or settled 
about our course of conduct, I am unable t
o see it.
Our floundering and purposeless 
conduct during this period was due, I 
be¬lieve, to the fact that, as a nation, we 
did not understand our proper role in the 
world and had failed to examine and 
agree upon certain basic convictions 
which are essential to any policy. 
Although we had done more than any 
other nation to develop the scientific 
technology which destroyed our 
isolation, we refused to acknowledge the 
result. We were unable to disentangle our 
prejudices and superficial dislikes from