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September 12, 1969
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
S10509
Governments, as do people, develop
vested Interests, and when governments
manipulate and control the flow of
information bearing on vital public
interests it promotes its own, not the public's,
interest. Thomas Jefferson, a believer in
the public's right to know, put the issue
at stake this way:
He who permits himself to tell a lie once,
finds It much easier to do it a second and
third time, till at length It becomes habitual;
he tells lies without attending to it, and
truths without the world's believing him.
This falsehood of the tongue leads to that
of the heart, and in time depraves all its
good dispositions.
I hope that the disease he described
has not reached the heart of America.
But the disease is curable by ample doses
of the truth. This administration can
start the process. Whether it will do so
remains to be seen-but this exchange
of correspondence is not a hopeful sign.
Exhibit 1
Department of State,
Washington, D.C, September 2, 1969.
Hon. J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in
response to your letter of May 12 to Secretary
Rogers in which you refer to General
Westmoreland's "Report on the War in Viet-Nam."
You specifically asked about "a formal
request from the South Vietnamese
Government for United States intervention with
combat troops."
As General Westmoreland's report makes
clear, the initial decisions to deploy United
States combat troops to South Viet-Nam in
the spring and summer of 1965 resulted from
a continuing analysis of a constantly-changing
situation, a major factor in which was
the deployment to South Viet-Nam of
regular North Vietnamese Army units from the
end of 1964 onward. As General
Westmoreland states in later portions of his report,
the subsequent infiltration of still more
North Vietnamese Army units and the
intensified offensive activity which those forces
undertook necessitated the assignment of
additional United States combat forces and
the expansion of their role beyond the
relatively limited one originally conceived.
The continuing analysis to which I have
referred, and the series of decisions resulting
from it, were made In close and constant
consultation with the Government of VietNam.
The process of analyzing the situation
by the two governments, and the consultation
and agreement thereon, were such as to
be regarded by our government as
constituting a request from the Government of
Viet-Nam. This request was confirmed by the
Communique issued by the office of the
Prime Minister of the Government of
VietNam, Dr. Phan Huy Quat, on March 7, 1965,
concerning the arrival of two United States
Marine battalions in South Viet-Nam-the
first such deployment of United States
combat forces:
During these past months and particularly
in the course of the last few weeks, the
North Viet-Nam authorities have intensified
their aggression by sending arms and troops
by land and sea into the areas bordering the
17th parallel.
In the face of these undeniable acts of
open provocation, the Government of Vietnam
has asked for and obtained the agreement
of the American Government for the
stationing of two United States Marine
battalions at Da Nang, one of the vital military
zones of Viet-Nam, in order to reinforce both
the military and civilian defensive system.
This measure is part of a program of purely
legitimate defense made necessary by the
intensification of Communist aggression
directed, supported and enlarged by the Hanoi
authorities.
I trust that this information will prove
useful to you, and I hope that you will not
hesitate to call on me if I can be of further
assistance.
Sincerely yours,
H. G. Torbert, Jr.,
Acting Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
MAY 12, 1969.
Hon. William P. Rogers,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As you know,
questions have been raised, from time to time,
concerning the circumstances under which
United States combat forces were first sent
to Vietnam. In the recently released "Report
on the War in Vietnam," General
Westmoreland wrote:
"It was my estimate that the government
of Vietnam could not survive this
mounting enemy military and political
offensive for more than six months unless
the United States chose to increase its
military commitment. Substantial numbers of
U.S. ground combat forces were required.
"I realized, as did Ambassadors Taylor and
Johnson, that the U.S. was faced with a
momentous and far-reaching decision. In
making my recommendations in the spring
and early summer of 1965, as indeed in the
case of later recommendations, I was
mindful of the stated U.S. objective with respect
to Vietnam: 'To defeat aggression so that the
people of South Vietnam will be free to shape
their own destiny.' It was my judgment that
this end could not be achieved without the
deployment of U.S. forces. With the
concurrence of Ambassador Taylor, I so
recommended."
I was unable to find any reference in
General Westmoreland's account of a formal
request from the South Vietnamese
government for U.S. intervention with combat
troops. For the Committee's records, would
you please provide copies of any such
request received from that government.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman.
MICROSTATES
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
have been noting with interest and mild
encouragement the initiative taken by
the U.S. Representative to the United
Nations in proposing that the United
Nations consider the creation of a
category of associate membership for
so- called mini- or micro-states.
The Committee on Foreign Relations
has long been concerned with the
unrealistic distribution of voting power in
the General Assembly of the United
Nations and has repeatedly questioned the
equally unrealistic policy of the
Department of State of assigning full-fledged
ambassadors to every independent
nation, no matter how minimum our
interests.
I commend Ambassador Yost for
stimulating thinking and action in the United
Nations on its relations to mini- and
micro-states and express the hope that
our State Department will do likewise
in this area.
I ask unanimous consent that
Ambassador Yost's statement of August 27 to
the Security Council be printed in the
Record at this point, together with an
editorial from the Washington Post of
the same date.
There being no objection, the statement
and editorial were ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
Statement by Ambassador Charles W.
Yost, Representative of United States to
the United Nations, in the Security
Council on the Question of Micro-
States, August 27, 1969
Mr. President, the United States has
requested this meeting of the Security
Council to deal with an important problem which
has long been foreseen in the evolution of
the United Nations, but on which the first
practical step has yet to be taken-with
the consequence that a solution to it is
now urgently required. That problem is to
find a way by which the growing number
of very small independent states, often
called "micro-states"-many of which may
soon seek to become members of the United
Nations-can find an appropriate place and
status within the United Nations family.
Such a status should respond to their needs
and rights, yet should not do violence either
to their nature and interests or to the
nature and interests of the United Nations
itself.
To put this matter in its most concrete
terms: Should even the smallest independent
state be eligible for full membership in
the United Nations, no matter how few its
people or how limited its resources may be?
What would be the consequence for the
authority and effectiveness of our Organization
if, during the coming years, 40 or 50
very small states, so small as to be unable
to carry out the obligations of membership,
should nevertheless apply and be admitted as
members? What alternative methods might
be devised for associating such states with
the United Nations, for assuring them of
its benefits without imposing upon them
burdens they could not bear, and for giving
them a status within the UN family
appropriate to their independence, their
capabilities and their needs?
This problem did not become urgent for
the United Nations until recent years, when
the progressive ending of the colonial age
began to bring into being independent states
of widely varying size-some very substantial
but others very small indeed. Our Secretary
General was the first to mark the problem
officially for our attention when he referred,
in the introduction to his annual report for
1965, to "the recent phenomenon of the
emergence of exceptionally small new states
(whose) limited size and resources can pose
a difficult problem as to the role they should
try to play in international life."
The Secretary General went on to suggest
that "the time has come when member states
may wi^h to examine more closely the criteria
for the admission of new Members in
the light of the long-term implications of
present trends."
Later, in the introduction to his annual
report in 1967, the Secretary General again
raised this same question and discussed it
in more detail. He urged that "the line has
to be drawn somewhere" in the matter of
membership, and noted that the Charter
itself limits United Nations membership to
states which not only are peace-loving, but
in the judgment of the Organization "are
able and willing" to carry out the obligations
laid down by the Charter. In the light of
this Charter rule,' he pointed to the problem
posed by emerging micro-states, some of
which contain only a few thousand or, in
one case, fewer than 100 people.
From these considerations the Secretary
General drew certain conclusions which, in
my Government's view, are entirely sound,
and which I commend to the Council:
That full membership in the United
Nations "may, on the one hand, impose
obligations which are too onerous for the
'micro- states' and, on the other hand, may lead to
a weakening of the United Nations itself."
That "it appears desirable that a
distinction be made between the right to independ-
