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We are all products of our experience and Mr. Nixon is no
exception. After twenty-five years of fighting communism, real
and imaginary, at home and abroad, Mr. Nixon has shown himself
at the crucial moment unwilling to settle for a "reasonable
chance" in the contest with Vietnamese communism. He still
wants the victory and the submission of the enemy that have
eluded two presidents for seven years. His prejudices, and
perhaps the background in which those were formed, seem to
have incapacitated this President for making a compromise peace.
The President's incapacity has mm thrust the responsibility
upon the shoulders of a Congress which has long struggled to
escape it. But the responsibility is now inescapable. It is
up to Congress, through its appropriations power, to bring
about a peace in which both sides in South Vietnam will have
a chance for power. That is the kind of peace Kissinger
almost attained, end it must be recognized that an essential
element to such an agreement is that it might result eventually
in a Communist South Vietnam. If the Thieu regime is capable
of marshaling its superior resources and inspiring the loyalty
of its people, it will prevail without further American
participation. But if it cannot, the Vietcong will prevail. That is
the meaning -- the only possible meaning -- of a "reasonable
chance."
Power end responsibility go together. If Congress legislates
an end to the war leaving Mr. Thieu no more than a "reasonable
chance" for survival, Congress, and not the President, will be
accountable for the consequences of such a settlement. If
South Vietnam then went Communist, it would not be Mr. Nixon's
Fault; it would not be his "defeat and humiliation." But if,
as I believe, America should find itself freer, stronger and
happier in peace than It has been In a decade, regardless of the
final result in Vietnam, that too would go on Congress’s account
and not on the account of an incapacitated President.
For several decades American Presidents have made war as
they saw fit because Congress seemed incapable of asserting
its constitutional war power. Now, in an ironic twist of
events, the President seem incapable of making peace and it is
up to Congress to fill the void. It is a considerable
responsibility, but it cannot be avoided. If Congress does not now
accept responsibility for ending the war, then it must share
in full measure with Mr. Nixon the responsibility for
perpetuating it.
Fulbright Speeches
